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FIRST AMENDMENT-GUARANTEE OF
PUBLIC ACCESS TO VOIR DIRE
Press-Enterprise Company v. Superior Court, 104 S. Ct. 819
(1984)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Press-Enterprise Company v. Superior Court,' the United States
Supreme Court held that the first amendment erects a presumption
in favor of public access to the voir dire examination of potential
jurors in criminal trials.2 The State, through its courts, may limit or
deny this right of access but only if such a restriction is necessitated
by a compelling interest in the preservation of "higher values."
The Court also held that any restriction on public access must be
narrowly tailored to preserve that compelling interest.4
The Court's decision to establish a presumption in favor of an
open voir dire logically extends its previous decisions concerning
such a first amendment guarantee during the actual trial5 in order to
enhance public scrutiny of governmental functions. 6 The Court rec-
ognized, however, that this guarantee of an open public proceeding
potentially can intrude upon the legitimate privacy interests of ju-
rors and other compelling state interests. 7 From a practical stand-
point, therefore, the decision raises questions concerning how trial
judges should apply the Press-Enterprise standard to pretrial proceed-
ings other than the voir dire. The "higher values" standard promul-
gated here by the Court establishes the open voir dire presumption
as a balance between first amendment and sixth amendment consid-
1 104 S. Ct. 819 (1984).
2 The first amendment provides the basis for the presumption of access herein es-
tablished. Id. at 824 n.8; see also infra notes 98, 99, 103-06, and accompanying text. The
first amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3 See infra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
4 See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
5 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982); Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569-71 (1980); see infra notes 34-50
and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
7 Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 825.
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erations, reflecting the public's need for scrutiny as it bears on the
defendant's right to a fair trial. Although somewhat ambiguous on
its face, the "higher values" standard should provide a workable
guideline for resolving this potential conflict between public access
considerations and other potentially compelling interests as they af-
fect the defendant's right to a fair trial.8
Initially, this Note will explore more fully the interests at stake
in the Press-Enterprise standard and examine the role of those inter-
ests in that standard. Then, it will discuss the standard itself and the
major questions that confront a trial judge attempting to implement
it. Finally, it will briefly examine some of the possible alternative
methods of closure once closure is deemed necessary.
II. HISTORY
The Supreme Court, when first presented with the question of
the public's right of access to a criminal trial, found that no such
right existed in the sixth amendment;9 it did suggest, however, that
the public might have a right of access to a trial grounded in the first
amendment.10 In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,t t the Supreme Court
held that the sixth amendment does not guarantee to the public the
right to attend criminal trials.' 2 The sixth amendment's guarantee
of a public trial exists solely for the defendant's benefit;' 3 no correl-
ative sixth amendment right attaches to the general public to de-
mand a public trial. 14 Gannett involved the denial of public access to
a pretrial suppression hearing. 15 The trial court, with the agree-
8 See infra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
9 The sixth amendment states, in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial .... "U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
10 See infra notes 12-15, 23-28 and accompanying text.
11 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
12 Id. at 391. In Gannett, the trial court excluded petitioner newspaper company
from a pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress confessions allegedly given involuntarily
and physical evidence seized as a result of these confessions. Id. at 374-75. Defense
attorneys had requested that the public and press be excluded because of the possible
prejudicial consequences of the adverse publicity; the District Attorney did not oppose
the motion. Id. at 375. The trial judge granted the motion without any objection from
petitioner's reporter at that time. Id.
13 Id. at 380-81 (citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948)). The Court wrote that" 'The purpose of the requirement of a public trial was to
guarantee that the accused would be fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned.'"
Gannett, 443 U.S. at 381 (quoting Estes, 381 U.S. at 538-39).
14 Gannett, 443 U.S. at 381. Because the Court found that the right to a public trial
reposes solely in the defendant, defendants can waive that right much as they can waive
their right to a trial by jury, at least in the context of the pretrial suppression hearing.
Id. at 383-84.
15 Id. at 391-93. The Court distinguished considerations applicable to pretrial sup-
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ment of both parties, "temporarily" 16 closed the hearing to the pub-
lic and the press.1 7 Despite the broad language of the Supreme
Court's holding and the Court's analysis, both of which could apply
to all facets of the trial, the majority's decision chiefly rests on con-
siderations related to pretrial hearings,18 suggesting a more restric-
tive reading of the holding.
In denying the public a right of access based on the sixth
amendment, the Court focused on the effect that a public proceed-
ing would have on the defendant's guarantee of a fair trial. 19 The
Court declared that the "special risks of unfairness," both in a sup-
pression hearing and in pretrial proceedings in general, dictated
that the defendant's right to a fair trial was of paramount impor-
tance when compared to the right to a public trial, especially when
someone other than the defendant is attempting to assert this right
of a public trial. 20 In a more historical vein,2 1 the Court pointed out
that "pretrial proceedings, precisely because of this same concern
for a fair trial, were never characterized by the same degree of open-
ness as were actual trials." 22
The Court, however, did not restrict its analysis in Gannett to
the sixth amendment. It also explored the possibility of a public
right of access grounded in the first amendment. 23 The Court de-
nied petitioner newspaper's claim of first amendment infringement
for two reasons. First, although none of the courtroom observers
pression hearings from those involved in the actual trial. See infra notes 21-22 and ac-
companying text.
16 In Gannett, the trial court's "temporary" closure consisted of a closed hearing; the
transcript was later released to the press and to the public. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 393.
17 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
19 Gannett, 443 U.S. at 387-91.
20 Id. at 378. The Court's justification was that "[t]he whole purpose of such hear-
ings is to screen out unreliable or illegally obtained evidence and insure that this evi-
dence does not become known to the jury." Id.
21 The Court explained that even if the sixth and fourteenth amendments did bestow
a right of access to criminal trials to the public, "it would not necessarily follow that the
petitioner would have a right of access under the circumstances of this case. For there
exists no persuasive evidence that at common law members of the public had any right
to attend pretrial proceedings; indeed, there is substantial evidence to the contrary." Id.
at 387.
22 Id. at 387-88. The Court relied on historical precedent from English common law,
id. at 387-89, and the American "judicial landscape," id. at 390-91, to support this
statement.
23 Id. at 391-93. The Court has long held that the first amendment applies to the
states through the fourteenth amendment; thus, the states and state employees, includ-
ing state judges, may not abridge free speech. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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objected to the defendant's closure motion,24 petitioner's objections
were voiced at a subsequent hearing.25 The trial court acknowl-
edged that the press representatives had a constitutional right of
access, but found that the defendant's right to a fair trial outweighed
the right of access. 26 The Court examined the trial judge's determi-
nation that an open proceeding would have posed a "reasonable
probability of prejudice to these defendants." 27 The Court sanc-
tioned the closure decision because it was based "on an assessment
of the competing societal interests involved. . . rather than on any
determination that First Amendment freedoms were not impli-
cated." 2 8 The Court later explicitly endorsed this assessment of
competing interests in Press-Enterprise .29
The Court also relied upon the temporary nature of the denial
of access in upholding the lower court's closure order in Gannett .3o
The press, and consequently the public, had access to a transcript of
the suppression hearing once the danger of prejudice had dissi-
pated, thus preserving both public access 31 and the defendant's in-
terest in a fair trial. 32 The Court then concluded that "[u]nder these
circumstances, any first and fourteenth amendment right of the peti-
tioner to attend a criminal trial was not violated." 33
The Court expanded upon this first and fourteenth amendment
analysis in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia .4 In Richmond News-
papers, the trial court granted a motion by the defendant to close his
fourth retrial for murder to the public, fearing the possibility of ju-
ror contamination and juror distractions. 35 The Virginia Supreme
24 Petitioner's reporter was among the courtroom observers that did not object to
the closure motion. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 392.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 393.
27 Id.
28 Id. (quoting Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974)).
29 See, e.g., infra note 109 and accompanying text.
30 Gannett, 443 U.S. at 393.
31 See infra notes 91-107 and accompanying text.
32 Id.
33 Id. The Court explained this conclusion as follows: "The press and the public
then had a full opportunity to scrutinize the suppression hearing. Unlike the case of an
absolute ban on access, therefore, the press here had the opportunity to inform the
public of the details of the pretrial hearing accurately and completely." Id.
34 448 U.S. 555 (1980). After three mistrials of a criminal defendant charged with
murder, the Virginia trial court granted defense counsel's motion to close the trial to the
public. Id. at 559-60. The prosecution had no objection, and none was made by others
present in the courtroom, including two of petitioner's reporters. Id. at 560. The trial
court denied the motion to vacate the closure order at a later hearing, and the Virginia
Supreme Court upheld this decision. Id. at 558-62.
35 Id. at 561.
[Vol. 75
VOIR DIRE
Court denied plenary review of this determination.3 6 In a plurality
opinion,3 7 the United States Supreme Court reversed the Virginia
court's decision to close the trial. After distinguishing Gannett on
the grounds that Gannett involved only the question of public access
to a pretrial motion under the sixth amendment,3 8 the Court held
that the public has a right to attend criminal trials implied in the first
amendment.3 9 This first amendment right exists apart from any
sixth amendment right previously foreclosed in Gannett .40 Consid-
erations regarding the fairness of criminal trials played a key role in
the Court's judgment protecting this right of access.4' The Court
held, however, that this right of access was not absolute; it could be
denied, but only by an "overriding interest" that was articulated in
findings by the trial court.42 The plurality opinion in Richmond News-
papers, then, appears to mark the beginning of the Court's trend to-
ward limiting the scope of Gannett, presumably restricting it to sixth
amendment claims of public access to pretrial proceedings. 43
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court ,44 the Court4 5 held that
the first amendment reposes in the public a right of access to crimi-
nal trials; like the plurality in Richmond Newspapers, however, the
Court in Globe Newspaper did not find this right of access to be abso-
36 Id. at 559-63.
37 Chief Justice Burger authored the plurality opinion and was joined by Justices
White and Stevens; Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun concurred in the judg-
ment, with Justice Marshall joining in Justice Brennan's opinion.
38 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564. The plurality also stated that the issue in
Richmond Newspapers regarding first and fourteenth amendment access to trials had not
previously been before the Court. Id
39 Id at 580. ChiefJustice Burger's plurality opinion was based on virtually the same
historical and public confidence rationale later employed in Press-Enterprise. See generally
id. at 564-73; see also Gannett, 443 U.S. at 419-33 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan,
White, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
40 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
41 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 568-71; see also id. at 593-97 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in the judgment).
42 448 U.S. at 581. The interpretation of the earlier Gannett decision ranged from
Justice Stewart's citation that although the sixth amendment does not confer on the
public or the press any right of access to a trial, this broad holding leaves open the
possibility of a right of access being guaranteed by other provisions of the Constitution,
id. at 598-99, to Justice Blackmun's continued belief that the decision in Gannett was in
error, id. at 603. In a separate opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
agreed with the majority view that the holding was limited to denial of a sixth amend-
ment public right of access to pretrial proceedings. Id at 584; see supra note 38 and
accompanying text.
43 448 U.S. at 580-81.
44 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
45 Justice Brennan authored the majority opinion, and was joined by Justices White,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell; Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment; Chief
Justice Burger dissented, with Justice Rehnquist joining him; Justice Stevens also
dissented.
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lute.4 6 Public access to a criminal trial could be restricted, but only
if public attendance at the trial would infringe on a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, such as the interest of the public and the defend-
ant in a fair criminal justice system,47 and if the restriction imposed
on public access was narrowly tailored to protect that interest.48
Thus, the Court has advocated a case-by-case evaluation of the in-
terests that compete with the public right of access to criminal
trials.49
Although the Court enunciated in Globe Newspaper a strong pre-
sumption in favor of public access to a criminal trial, Gannett contin-
ued to raise questions concerning the Court's stance on public
access to pretrial proceedings 50 because a sixth amendment right of
public access to pretrial proceedings remained foreclosed. 51 Addi-
tionally, the Court's position regarding a first amendment right of
access to pretrial proceedings remained unresolved, a situation that
may have resulted simply from the plaintiff making the incorrect
constitutional claim.52 Press-Enterprise, however, presented the
Court with an opportunity to explore the first amendment right of
public access and its impact on the other potentially conflicting in-
terests in the setting of a voir dire proceeding.
46 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07.
47 Id. at 606.
48 Id.
49 In Globe Newspaper, the Court applied this standard to its examination of the exclu-
sion by the trial court of the press and the public from the trial of a defendant charged
with the rape of three minor girls, pursuant to a Massachusetts statute requiring such
closure. Id. at 598. The Massachusetts Supreme Court construed the statute, MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (1981), to require such exclusion during the victim's
testimony pertaining to specified sexual offenses involving victims under age 18. Globe
Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 599-600. The Court found that safeguarding the psychological
welfare of a minor victim, as well as encouraging such victims to testify, amounted to a
compelling inierest. Id. at 607; see also supra note 48 and accompanying text. The
Court, however, proceeded to invalidate the Massachusetts statute because it set forth a
mandatory closure rule. 457 U.S. at 607-08.
Emphasizing that "the circumstances of the particular case may affect the signifi-
cance of the interest," the Court concluded that, in the trial setting, "a trial court can
determine on a case-by-case basis whether closure is necessary to protect the welfare of
a minor victim." Id. The Court also listed several factors to be used in weighing the
significance of the minor's interest, including: "the minor victim's age, psychological
maturity and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the victim, and the
interests of parents and relatives." Id.
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented, finding the exclusion
of the press and the public only during the minor victim's actual testimony a rational
limitation that furthered the State interest in protecting the welfare of the minor victim.
Id. at 616-17.
50 The plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers limited the application of Gannett to
pretrial proceedings. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
51 Gannett, 443 U.S. at 391.
52 See supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
588 [Vol. 75
1984] VOIR DIRE 589
III. FACTS OF PRESS-ENTERPRISE
Albert Greenwood Brown, Jr., was convicted in the Superior
Court of California, Riverside County, for the rape and murder of a
teenage girl.53 He was sentenced to death.54 Prior to the com-
mencement of the voir dire examination of the prospective jurors,
Press-Enterprise Co. petitioned the court to open the voir dire to the
public and the press. 55 Petitioner contended that the public has an
absolute right of access to the trial proceedings and that the voir dire
is an essential component of those proceedings. 56 In opposing peti-
tioner's motion, the State argued that if the press were present at
the voir dire, the individual responses of the potential jurors would
lack the candor necessary to assure the defendant a fair trial. 57
The trial judge agreed with the State and denied Press-Enter-
prise Co.'s motion. The court limited the petitioner's presence in
the courtroom to the "general voir dire,"58 and denied petitioner
and the public access to the individual voir dire of the prospective
jurors.59 During the "individual voir dire ," the State and the defense
questioned each potential juror about his or her opinion concerning
the death penalty,60 as well as other sensitive issues.61 As a result of
53 Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 821. The relevant portion of California's murder stat-
ute, under which Brown was prosecuted, provides:
All murder which is perpetrated by means of a bomb, poison, lying in wait,
torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or
which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempting to perpetrate, arson, rape,
robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any act punishable under Section 288, is murder of
the first degree ....
CAL. GRIM. CODE ch. 1, § 189 (West 1981).
54 104 S. Ct. at 821. Brown was sentenced pursuant to California's murder punish-
ment statute, which states: "Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer
death, or confinement in the state prison for life, at the discretion of the court or jury
trying the same, and the matter of punishment shall be determined as provided in Sec-
tion 190.1 .... ." CAL. CRIM. CODE ch. 1, § 190 (West 1981).
55 104 S. Ct. at 821.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. The general voir dire primarily involves asking questions regarding the pro-
spectivejurors' backgrounds and past orientation to the case at hand; the individual voir
dire involves asking more particularized questions designed to elicit the prospective ju-
rors' orientation toward or knowledge of some of the more specific issues in the case.
See generally MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 36 (6th ed. 1980).
59 Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 821; see also infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
60 This process is known as "death qualification." It encompasses that portion of
the voir dire in a capital trial wherein counsel question the veniremen regarding their
views on the imposition of the death penalty, should the trial reach the sentencing stage.
In Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301 (1981),
the California Supreme Court held that potential jurors must be sequestered from other
jurors during the death qualification process. The United States Supreme Court has
held that counsel may question the veniremen regarding their views on the imposition of
the death penalty, but that jurors may not be excluded from the panel for cause because
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the trial court's closure order, the public and the press could attend
only about three days of the approximately six-week voir dire .62
Once the jury was empaneled, Press-Enterprise Co. moved the
trial court to release a complete transcript of the voir dire proceed-
ings. 63 The defendant opposed this motion, arguing that releasing
the transcript would violate the jurors' right of privacy. 64 The State
also opposed release of the transcript on the same grounds, adding
that the veniremen had answered questions during the voir dire
under an "implied promise of confidentiality." 65 The court denied
petitioner's motion to release the transcript.66 It concluded that the
jurors' right of privacy 67 and the defendant's right to a fair trialjus-
tified the limitation on the public's right of access to the voir dire,
even though the voir dire represents an exercise of governmental
power by the judiciary.68 The trial court did recognize that people
generally have a right to know and observe governmental exercises
of power.69
The jury found Brown guilty of the rape and murder of the
teenage girl and, pursuant to California's death penalty statute,70
of these views. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (excluding anti-death
jurors for cause does not permit an adequate cross-section on the panel). It is constitu-
tionally permissible to exclude jurors who refuse to impose the death penalty perempto-
rily. See Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981), mod on reh. , 671 F.2d 858 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982); Spenkelink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979) (excluding anti-death veniremen from the jury is
not unconstitutional).
61 Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 821.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. The motion was denied without prejudice. Id.
67 At oral argument on the motion to release the transcript, the trial judge supported
his closure order based on the "implied confidentiality" of voir dire, and described the
prospective jurors' voir dire responses as follows: "Most of them are of little moment.
There are a few, however, in which some personal problems were discussed which could
be somewhat sensitive as far as publication of those particular individual's [sic] situa-
tions are concerned." Id. (quoting Appendix at 103).
68 Id. At oral argument, the trial judge also stated:
I agree with much of what defense counsel and People's counsel have said and I
also, regardless of the public's right to know, I also [sic] feel that's rather difficult
that by a person performing their civic duty as a prospective juror putting their
private information as open to the public which I just think there is certain areas
[sic] that the right of privacy should prevail and a right to a fair trial should prevail
and the right of the people to know, I think, should have some limitations, so at this
stage, the motion to open up the individual sequestered voir dire proceedings is
denied without prejudice.
Id. (quoting Appendix at 121).
69 Id.
70 See supra note 54.
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sentenced him to death.7 ' After sentencing, Press-Enterprise Co.
once again applied for release, of the voir dire transcript and this mo-
tion again was denied.7 2 The trial judge justified this decision by
emphasizing the possible infringement on some jurors' privacy
rights:
The jurors were questioned in private relating to past exper-
iences, and while most of the information is dull and boring, some of
the jurors had some special experiences in sensitive areas that do not
appear to be appropriate for public discussion. 73
Petitioner then sought a writ of mandate from the California
Court of Appeals to compel the Superior Court to release the voir
dire transcript and to vacate the order closing the voir dire proceed-
ings.7 4 The petition was denied.7 5 The California Supreme Court
subsequently denied Press-Enterprise Co.'s request for a hearing.76
On January 24, 1983, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.77
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
The Supreme Court unanimously78 reversed the result reached
by the California courts79 and held that the guarantees of open pub-
lic proceedings in criminal trials encompassed the voir dire examina-
tion of potential jurors8 0 Although unanimous in the result, several
opinions were filed because the Justices disagreed on the rationale
behind this result. The Burger majority based its decision on the
historical evolution of the voir dire 81 and a desire to preserve public
confidence in judicial proceedings.8 2 The majority also left open
the possibility that potential jurors might possess an independent
privacy right that could warrant the limitation or even closure of the
71 Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 821.
72 Id
73 Id. (quoting Appendix at 39).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 459 U.S. 1145 (1983).
78 Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, White,
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor. Justices Stevens and Blackmun
filed concurring opinions, and Justice Marshall filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment.
79 The California Court of Appeals denied petitioner's petition for a writ of mandate
to compel the release of the voir dire transcript and vacate the trial court's order closing
the voir dire proceedings. Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 821.
80 Id at 824-26.
81 Id. at 822-23. For a discussion of the majority opinion, see infra notes 87-116 and
accompanying text.
82 Id4 at 823-24.
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voir dire .83 Justice Blackmun concurred in the decision, but empha-
sized that the Court had not established any juror right to privacy.8 4
Justice Stevens also concurred in the decision, stressing that be-
cause the first amendment basis for the decision did not require the
Court to decide whether the voir dire is part of the "trial" for sixth
amendment purposes, the Court had not decided that issue.8 5 Fi-
nally, Justice Marshall concurred in the result reached by the major-
ity but disagreed with its suggestion that the potential privacy
interests of the prospective jurors lessens the public right to
access.
8 6
A. THE BURGER MAJORITY
ChiefJustice Burger, writing for the Court, found that the pre-
sumption in favor of public access to court proceedings extends to
the voir dire, and that this presumption can be overcome only by
demonstrating, through articulated findings, that an overriding in-
terest8 7 was in fact threatened by an open proceeding.88 Also, any
closure order must be narrowly tailored to serve the interest at stake
and the articulated findings must be specific enough to enable a re-
viewing court to evaluate the propriety of any closure order.8 9 The
Court held that the California court's closure order did not satisfy
these criteria; the California court insufficiently supported its clo-
sure order with findings showing that an open proceeding in fact
would have threatened an overriding interest. 90 In addition, even if
the findings had been adequate to support some form of closure,
the Court concluded that the trial court failed to consider alterna-
tives to its virtually complete closure of the voir dire, thereby render-
ing its closure order unconstitutional. 91
The Court found a presumption in favor of public access to the
voir dire in both history and public policy. After an historical analy-
sis of the development of the role of public access in the criminal
83 Id. at 825.
84 Id. at 826-27 (Blackman, J., concurring); see infra notes 117-25 and accompanying
text.
85 Id. at 827-29 (Stevens, J., concurring); see infra notes 126-35 and accompanying
text.
86 Id. at 829-31 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result); see infra notes 136-40 and
accompanying text.
87 The Court stated that the defendant's right to a fair trial was a compelling interest,
and that the right to privacy of prospective jurors was potentially a compelling interest.
Id. at 824-25.
88 Id. at 824.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 824-25.
91 Id. at 825.
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trial itself,92 the Chief Justice concluded that since before the sign-
ing of the Constitution, criminal trials were open to the public in
both the United States and in England.93 In addition, the "historical
evidence" 94 suggested that "since the development of trial by jury,
the process of selection ofjurors has been a public process with ex-
ceptions only for good cause shown." 95 Thus, the Court concluded
that history supports a presumption in favor of public access to the
voir dire .96
The Court also justified this presumption favoring an open voir
dire on several policy grounds. First, the Court found that public
access to the voir dire would enhance public confidence in the "fair"
operation of government, a confidence necessary to the survival of
our republican system.97 The Court reasoned that even though
every individual cannot actually attend the proceedings, the public
at large can be confident that the courts are following established
procedures and that any deviations will become public knowledge
92 Id. at 822.
93 IaL
94 Id. ChiefJustice Burger first examined the period before the Norman Conquest in
England, when cases were brought before "moots," which were essentially town meet-
ings "such as the local court of the hundred or the county court." Id. (citing Pollock,
English Law Before the Norman Conquest, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY 88, 89 (1907)). Attendance at "moots" was virtually mandatory for the com-
munity's freemen, who represented the "patria," or "country," in rendering judgment.
Ia The Court's opinion then touched on the years after the Norman Conquest up
through the 16th century, covering the evolution of thejury system into a small segment
representing the community, and its emergence as an impartial trier of facts, largely due
to the development of the system of challenging the jurors. Id. (citing 1 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 332, 335 (7th ed. 1956)). The Court suggested that
jurors were selected in public beginning in the 16th century. Id. at 822-23.
The authority relied upon by the Chief Justice suggests that the public was not
merely allowed but encouraged to attend the trial proceedings. Formerly, nothing con-
cerning the trial was written down except the "enditement"; all other facets of the trial
were " 'doone openlie in the presence of the Judges, the Justices, the enquest, and so
many as will or can come so neare as to heare it.'" Id. (citing T. SMrrH, DE REPUBLICA AN-
GLORUM 96, 101 (Alston ed. 1906) (emphasis added)). Colonial America then adopted
the presumptive openness ofjury selection from England, and this public jury selection
was "the common practice in America when the Constitution was adopted." Id. at 823.
95 Id at 822.
96 Id at 823. In addition, the presence of others at the trial enabled "either party to
pray a tales," 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 349 (13th ed.
1800), if the number of jurors was insufficient due to challenges. In footnote 6, the
ChiefJustice states:
By the statute 35 Hen. 8, ch. 6 (1543), the judge was empowered to award a
"tales de circumstantibus of persons present in the court, to be joined to the other
jurors to try the cause." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra, at 365. If the judge issued such a
writ, the sheriff brought forward "talesmen" from among the bystanders in the
courtroom. These talesmen were then subject to the same challenges as the others.
104 S. Ct. at 823 n.6.
97 104 S. Ct. at 823-24.
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because anyone is free to attend trials. 98
Second, the Court found that public access to the voir dire pro-
vides the accused with a benefit correlative to the benefit of en-
hanced public confidence. 99 Because openness provides for
scrutiny of court procedures as well as decisions, courts adhere
more closely to those procedures created to guarantee the accused a
fair trial. 0 0 The selection of an impartial jury is a procedure that is
essential to a fair trial. 1° 1 Hence, the open voir dire proceedings en-
hance both the appearance of fairness upon which public confidence
in the system rests and the fundamental fairness of the criminal
process. 102
Finally, the Court justified a presumption in favor of public ac-
cess to trials because open trials have a "community therapeutic
value."' 0 3 The Court found that criminal acts, particularly violent
crimes, "generate a community urge to retaliate and desire to have
justice done."'1 4 Public awareness that the law is being enforced
and that the criminal justice system is functioning provides a thera-
peutic outlet for these community urges. 10 5 Chief Justice Burger
thus concluded that the concerns of both the victims in particular
and the community as a whole are vindicated with the knowledge
that "offenders are being brought to account for their criminal con-
duct by jurors fairly and openly selected."' 10 6 Although each of
these policy considerations had been offered in the past to support
public access to trials, the Court found these policies equally appli-
cable to the pretrial voir dire .107
The Court, however, did not completely rule out the possibility
of closure. Although it did state that such a limitation must be "rare
and only for cause shown that outweighs the value of openness,"' 08
98 Id. at 823. According to the majority, "The value of openness lies in the fact that
people not actually attending the trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are
being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that
established procedures are being followed and that deviations will become known." Id.
(emphasis in original).
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569-71).
103 Id. (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 578).
104 Id. ; see T. REIK, THE COMPULSION TO CONFESS 288-95, 408 (1959).
105 Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 823-24. "Proceedings held in secret would deny this
outlet and frustrate the broad public interest." Id. at 824.
106 Id. "People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions,
but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing." Id (quot-
ing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572).
107 Id.
108 Id. ChiefJustice Burger distinguished the first amendment question of the open-
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the Court found that some situations might require the closure of
the voir dire .109 Consequently, the Court articulated a two-part test
for determining when this presumption is rebutted:
The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an over-
riding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The inter-
est is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a re-
viewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly
entered."10
The Court judged the California court's closure order against
this test and concluded that the closure order was unconstitu-
tional.1 1 ' It also noted with displeasure that a voir dire of six weeks
"in and of itself undermines public confidence in the courts and the
legal profession."1 2 Although the superior court had stated that the
sixth amendment right of the accused to an impartial jury and the
privacy interests of the prospective jurors could justify closing the
voir dire to public access," 3 the Supreme Court held that the supe-
rior court failed to support its decision by showing "that an open
proceeding in fact threatened those interests."" t4 Thus, the Court
determined that it was impossible to conclude that closure was war-
ranted.115 Furthermore, even had the trial judge's findings been ad-
equate to support closure, the Court reasoned that the failure to
consider alternatives to combining closure of the voir dire with total
suppression of the voir dire transcript rendered the trial judge's ac-
tions unconstitutional. 1 6
ness of voir dire from other questions, such as those regarding the fifth ainendment pro-
hibition against double jeopardy, where the determination of the start of the "trial"
becomes important. d ; see also Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963) ("trial"
begins when the jurors are sworn in); Wade v. Hunter, 366 U.S. 684, 688 (1949) ("trial"
begins when the first witness is sworn in).
109 Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 824.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 826.
112 Id at 824 n.9.
113 The Court recognized the sixth amendment right of a defendant to fundamental
fairness in jury selection as a compelling interest and added that the process of jury
selection may also create a compelling interest on the part of a prospective juror "when
the interrogation touches on deeply personal matters that person has legitimate reasons
for keeping out of the public domain." Id. at 825.
114 Id. at 824-25.
115 Id. Although the trial court judge had found that " 'some of the jurors had some
special experiences in sensitive areas that do not appear to be appropriate for public
discussion,' "id. at 821 (quoting Appendix at 39), the Supreme Court found such state-
ments to be insufficiently specific and concluded that the parts of the transcript that
reasonably entitled the jurors to privacy could have been sealed without such a sweeping
order; in any event, the "trial judge should explain why the material is entitled to pri-
vacy." Id. at 826.
116 Id. at 825. Two of the alternatives mentioned by the Chief Justice include (1)
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B. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Blackmun concurred in the Court's decision because he
agreed that the trial court failed to articulate specific findings that a
compelling governmental interest 17 necessitated nondisclosure,
and also failed to demonstrate that the closure was narrowly tailored
to preserve that interest." 8 He wrote separately, however, to em-
phasize his understanding that the Court did not decide whether
jurors have a privacy right that can compel the closure of the voir
dire and the suppression of the voir dire transcript. 119 Although
agreeing that jurors may have a privacy right that could be
threatened by an open voir dire proceeding, 120 Justice Blackmun
cautioned the Court against assuming the existence of such a strong
privacy right without considering its possible consequences; he
noted that the recognition of such a right could unnecessarily com-
plicate voir dire proceedings. 12' In addition, according to Justice
Blackmun, both the defendant' 22 and the State' 23 have a strong in-
centive to protect fully the privacy interests of the veniremen to en-
requiring a prospective juror affirmatively to request an opportunity to present the
problem to the judge in camera, with counsel present and on the record, once the gen-
eral nature of the sensitive questions is made known to them; and (2) disclosing the
substance of the private material while preserving the anonymity of the individuals
sought to be protected. Id. at 825-26; see also supra note 60.
117 Justice Blackmun used the language from Globe Newspaper that was quoted earlier
in the majority opinion, 104 S. Ct. at 824 (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07).
Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 826 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
118 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
119 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun deemed the question of a privacy
right as unnecessary to the determination of the case because (1) no juror was seeking to
vindicate such a right, and (2) the trial court's error alone justified the decision. Id. at
826-27 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also supra notes 64-65, 74-76 and accompanying
text.
120 104 S. Ct. at 826 (BlackmunJ., concurring). Justice Blackmun also suggested that
simply summoning the potential juror to his public duty cannot forfeit this privacy right.
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
121 Id. at 827 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun asked:
Could a juror who disagreed with a trial judge's determination that he had no
legitimate expectation of privacy in certain information refuse to answer without a
promise of confidentiality until some superior tribunal declared his expectation un-
reasonable? Could a juror ever refuse to answer a highly personal, but relevant,
question, on the ground that his privacy right outweighed the defendant's need to
know? I pose these questions only to emphasize that we should not assume the
existence of a juror's privacy right without considering carefully the implications of
that assumption.
Id.
122 "[T]he defendant has an interest in protecting juror privacy in order to encourage
honest answers to the voir dire questions." Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
123 "The State has a similar interest in protecting juror privacy, even after the trial-
to encourage juror honesty in the future-that almost always will be coextensive with the
juror's own privacy interest." Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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courage their full cooperation.1 24 Thus, Justice Blackmun felt that
the Court should avoid the determination of such a right until the
issue is squarely before it, and the Court can fully consider the
ramifications of the issue. 125
C. JUSTICE STEVENS' CONCURRENCE
Justice Stevens, also concurring in the decision, emphasized the
first amendment dimensions of the public right of access to the voir
dire .126 The first amendment is concerned with the general right of
public scrutiny of official proceedings. 127 The voir dire, like an ac-
tual trial, is just such an official proceeding.' 28 Thus, inJustice Ste-
vens' view, the presumption of public access encompasses more
than the mere enhancement of public confidence in the functioning
of the judiciary; 129 it encompasses the broader first amendment
" 'common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on
matters relating to the functioning of government.' "130 Justice Ste-
vens established the relationship between the first amendment's ac-
cess rights and their impact upon the judicial process.' 3 ' He then
reasoned that "a claim to access cannot succeed unless access makes
a positive contribution to this process of self-governance."' 1 2 Bas-
ing his conclusion on the enhanced public understanding of the voir
dire process that will result from public access to these proceedings,
Justice Stevens concluded that the public interest in avoiding
lengthy voir dire proceedings 3 3 justified such access. 134 Finally, Jus-
124 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
125 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
126 Id. at 827-28 (Stevens, J., concurring).
127 Id at 828 (Stevens, J., concurring).
128 Id at 827-28 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens also pointed out the well-
established principle that the fourteenth amendment extends the application of the first
amendment to the abridgment of speech or the press by the states, including, as in the
present controversy, state judges. Id. at 827 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Ne-
braska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
129 Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 827-28 (Stevens, J., concurring).
130 Id. at 828 (Stevens,J., concurring) (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575).
131 Id (Stevens, J., concurring); see also supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
132 104 S. Ct. at 828 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens relied on the Court's
opinion in Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. 596, wherein the Court stated:'
Underlying the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the com-
mon understanding that "a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the
free discussion of governmental affairs." Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218
(1966). By offering such protection, the First Amendment serves to ensure that the
individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our republican
form of self-government.
Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 828 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457
U.S. at 606).
133 Id. at 829 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring).
134 Id. at 828-29 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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tice Stevens agreed with the Court that jurors' privacy interests
could potentially provide a basis for some limitation of the public's
access to voir dire .135
D. JUSTICE MARSHALL'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Marshall concurred in the result reached by the major-
ity, but disagreed with the suggestion that the public's right of ac-
cess to the voir dire is diminished by the veniremen's right of privacy
when "deeply personal matters are likely to be elicited in the voir
dire proceedings."' 136 On the contrary, according to Justice Mar-
shall, "the policies underlying the public's right of access need pro-
tection most when courts attempt to conceal sensitive information
from the public that has a bearing upon the ability of jurors to im-
partially weigh the evidence presented to them."' 137 Consequently,
not only should any access limitation be ."narrowly tailored" to
serve a conflicting, though compelling interest, 138 but also "a trial
court should be obliged to show that the order in question consti-
tutes the least restrictive means available for protecting compelling state
interests" before issuing a closure order.139 Finally, Justice Mar-
shall objected to the majority's comments concerning the length of
the voir dire proceedings, suggesting that the defendant's right to a
135 Id. at 829 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens stated that this context is
among those in which "'a line may be drawn on the basis of content without violating
the government's paramount obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected com-
munication.' " Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Young v. American Mini Theaters,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion)). Justice Stevens observed that some of
the access restrictions necessarily would pertain to the subject matter of questions that
might probe into "areas of privacy that are worthy of protection." Id. (Stevens, J., con-
curring). He concluded that such restrictions would be permissible "[s]ince that func-
tion can safely be performed without compromising the First Amendment's mission of
securing meaningful public control over the process of governance, [hence] this form of
regulation is not an abridgment of any First Amendment right." Id. (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
136 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
137 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (referring to Globe Newspaper, 457
U.S. at 606 ("Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the
integrity of the factfinding process .... ")).
138 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
139 104 S. Ct. at 830 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in original).
Justice Marshall stated that
the constitutionally preferable method for reconciling the First Amendment inter-
ests of the public and press with the legitimate privacy interests of jurors and the
interests of defendants in fair trials is to redact transcripts in such a way as to pre-
serve the anonymity of jurors while disclosing the substance of their responses.
Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment); see also supra notes 60-61 and accompany-
ing text. He then added that the substance of a juror's response to questions at voir dire
can be excluded only "in the most extraordinary circumstances." 104 S. Ct. at 830 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring in the judgment).
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fair trial should not be subject to arbitrary time constraints.140
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's affirmation in Press-Enterprise of a public
right of access to voir dire proceedings grounded in the first amend-
ment logically extends to the pretrial context previous Court deci-
sions concerning access to the actual trial of a criminal defendant. 141
The decision appears to raise several questions concerning which
pretrial proceedings will be open for public scrutiny142 in light of
the Court's previous decision in Gannett.143 The Gannett result,
however, can be reconciled with Press-Enterprise. The more impor-
tant question remaining after Press-Enterprise concerns when courts
will decide to limit the public's access to pretrial proceedings.
The standard set forth by the Supreme Court appears clear.' 44
In practical application, however, the standard leaves trial judges
with fairly wide discretion in deciding when to issue a closure order.
The extent of the trial judges' discretion becomes evident when one
considers the cumulative effect of the three decisions prerequisite to
the issuance of any closure order. First, the trial judge must decide
140 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Marshall objected to foot-
note 9 of the Burger opinion, which stated:
We cannot fail to observe that a voir dire process of such length [six weeks], in
and of itself undermines public confidence in the courts and the legal profession.
The process is to ensure a fair impartial jury, not a favorable one. Judges, not advo-
cates, must control that process to make sure privileges are not so abused. Properly
conducted it is inconceivable that the process could extend over such a period. We
note, however, that in response to questions counsel stated that it is not unknown in
California courts for jury selection to extend six months.
Id. at 824 n.9 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). Noting that Albert Greenwood
Brown,Jr., was accused of an interracial sexual attack and murderJustice Marshall sug-
gested that "a greater than usual amount of inquiry may have been needed in order to
obtain a fair and impartial jury," and that six weeks is "not at all 'inconceivable'" in the
given context. Id. at 830 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). His objection fo-
cused on the fact that the Court possessed few of the facts that would enable it to decide
on how long such a proceeding should be, and that the question was not presented to
the Court. Id. For the same reasons, Justice Marshall stated that the majority's assump-
tion that a six-week voir dire, as in the situation before the Court, "'in and of itself
undermines public confidence in the courts and the legal profession'" is unwarranted.
Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 824
n.9). He then stated that the Court strayed beyond its proper role in lecturing the state
court on how to best structure its voir dire proceedings in the absence of a claim that the
length of such proceedings violates federal law. Id at 831 (Marshall, J., concurring in
the judgment).
141 See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555
(1980); see also supra notes 104-24 and accompanying text.
142 This assumes, of course, that these pretrial proceedings are not considered part of
the "trial." See supra note 108.
143 See supra notes 12-33 and accompanying text.
144 See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
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if the particular situation warrants a limitation on public access. 145
Next, the permissible scope of any limitation must be divined from
the opinion in Press-Enterprise .146 Finally, having decided that access
must be limited, the trial judge must determine the least restrictive
means of limiting public access, a decision implicit in the Court's
enumeration of several possible access-limitation alternatives.' 47
Prior to Press-Enterprise, the Supreme Court had not enunciated
a clear threshold test for limiting public access to criminal proceed-
ings, 148 although lower courts had addressed the issue. For in-
stance, in United States v. Brooklier, the Ninth Circuit employed a
standard based on substantial probability:
Since the purpose of the findings is to enable the appellate court
to determine whether the closure order was properly entered, the find-
ings must be sufficiently specific to show that the three substantive
prerequisites to closure have been satisfied-that there is a substantial
probability (1) that public proceedings would result in irreparable
damage to defendant's right to a fair trial, (2) that no alternative to
closure would adequately protect this right, and (3) that closure would
effectively protect it. 149
The Supreme Court, in cases such as Press-Enterprise, has since tight-
ened the threshold for closure, further emphasizing the importance
of the public right to access during criminal proceedings.' 5 0 Now, a
trial judge must demonstrate that an open proceeding in fact threat-
ens conflicting compelling interests, which will most often involve
the defendant's right to a fair trial. 151
The Supreme Court has determined that in order to limit the
first amendment right of public access to a criminal proceeding, a
trial court must balance the public access interests against other
compelling interests. 152 In determining what amounts to a compel-
ling interest militating for closure in the face of the public right of
access to criminal proceedings, the Court has placed not merely its
finger, but its entire weight on the scales to tip the balance in the
direction that will best preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial.
This bias in favor of the defendant's sixth amendment right is firmly
145 Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 824-25.
146 Id. at 824.
147 Id.; see also supra notes 16-17.
148 See, e.g., United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1982).
149 Id. at 1168-69. The test promulgated by the court in Brooklier is very close to that
of the Supreme Court, with the exception of the "in fact" language. See infra note 151
and accompanying text.
150 See, e.g. , Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 824.
151 Id. at 824-25.
152 Id. at 824; see also supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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established by the Court's language 53 in the line of decisions culmi-
nating in Press Enterprise 154 and by the policy underpinnings 55 for
protection of the public right of access to criminal proceedings.
Although the Court's language in Press-Enterprise suggests that
the right to privacy of prospective jurors might amount to a compel-
ling interest in itself,156 justice Marshall's analysis in particular sug-
gests that the Court's main concern with the privacy issue should
revolve around how this interest bears on the defendant's right to a
fair trial. 157 After all, as the majority states, "[n]o right ranks higher
than the right of the accused to a fair trial."' 58 Faced with a choice,
the Court implies that any privacy interest will be subordinated in
deference to the defendant's right to a fair trial.' 59
The interplay between the right to a fair trial and the public
access interests serves to make the line-drawing task of the trial
judge more difficult because the two interests involve many of the
same considerations. 60 In establishing a balance, the crux of the
public access issue lies in public scrutiny of all formal judicial pro-
ceedings because this scrutiny will lead to a public that is both confi-
dent and informed about its judiciary. 161 One of the underlying
assumptions of the public access argument is that the public interest
may not be protected fully, by the parties in a criminal trial. 162 The
public interest in a properly functioning judiciary is advanced pre-
cisely because of public access, which in turn enhances public confi-
dence in that system. 163 If access were denied, this confidence
153 See, e.g., supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
154 See also supra notes 15-23 (Gannett), 41-42 (Richmond Newspapers), 47-48 (Globe
Newspaper), and accompanying text.
155 See, e.g., supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
156 Press-Enterprise Co., 104 S. Ct. at 825. According to the majority, "[t]hejury selec-
tion process may, in some circumstances, give rise to a compelling interest of a prospec-
tive juror when interrogation touches on deeply personal matters that person has
legitimate reasons for keeping out of the public domain." Id.
157 Id at 830 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment); see also supra note 121 and
accompanying text.
158 Id. at 823.
159 Id- at 825. "The privacy interests of such a prospective juror must be balanced
against the historic values we have discussed and the need for openness of the process."
Id.
160 Id. at 823. "[T~he primacy of the accused's right [to a fair trial] is difficult to sepa-
rate from the right of everyone in the community to attend the voir dire which promotes
fairness." Id. ; see supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
161 104 S. Ct. at 823; see also Great Falls Tribune v. District Court, 608 P.2d 116, 119
(Mont. 1980).
162 In re United States ex rel. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 635 F.2d 676, 681 (8th Cir.
1980).
163 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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presumably would fade. 164
Another facet of the public interest in open trials involves the
perceived substantive fairness of the system as it derives from the
nature of crime and the criminal justice system. A crime is a wrong
against the people of the community as a whole; its effects are not
limited to the direct victim of the crime.' 65 Lay people are prone to
criticize the courts because of the perception that "the courts scru-
pulously observe every right of a defendant, but sometimes seem to
overlook that the public is also directly affected by criminal acts and
has a direct interest in the outcome of the proceedings."'' 66 Thus,
the public confidence concern rests on substantive grounds as well
as procedural integrity.
The public also maintains a pecuniary interest in criminal pro-
ceedings.' 67 The public interest in openness here is akin to that of
investors keeping track of their portfolios. This "public invest-
ment" rationale gives the public "every right to ascertain by per-
sonal observation whether its officials are carrying out their duties in
responsibly and capably administering justice, and it would require
unusual circumstances for this right to be held subordinate to the
contention of a defendant that he is prejudiced by a public trial (or
any part thereof)."' 168 Extending the analogy to the procedural and
substantive interests, the "public investors" have "votes" in the sub-
stance and procedure that they can delegate to their "proxy," the
State. The "public investors" presumably have the choice to vote,
for example by running for political office, or to delegate, which is
by far the more frequent choice, depending on how they perceive
their interests will be best served. Consequently, this public access
enhances public confidence, which, in turn, helps the public remain
comfortable with the delegation; because public representatives
need not attend every proceeding, the system retains its efficiency.
Public access also generally protects the public interest in assur-
ing the defendant a fair trial, a protection that the Court has repeat-
edly declared to be inviolable.' 69 Assurance to the public of
procedural and substantive integrity, both during and before the
trial, augments the fairness of the defendant's trial for virtually the
164 Id.
165 Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee, 553 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Ark. 1977).
166 Id. at 274.
167 Id. "[T]he courthouses are paid for with public funds; the judges, jurors, state's
attorney (and defense attorneys who have been appointed by the court because of the
indigency of their clients) are paid with public funds." Id.
168 Id.
169 See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
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same reasons.170 Thus, by providing the possibility, no matter how
small, that someone will be present at any criminal proceeding to
reveal falsehoods or errors in the proceeding and call them to the
attention of the interested parties, public scrutiny' 7 1 accrues to the
benefit of the defendant.' 72
The interests to be balanced by a trial judge before limiting
public access-the right to a fair trial and the public right of access
to the trial-are not always in harmony. 173 The evaluation of the
defendant's right to a fair trial includes the possible prejudicial ef-
fects from adverse publicity and juror contamination, 174 juror pri-
vacy, 175 and juror safety176 as they bear on the jurors' ability to fairly
weigh the evidence at trial. Public access may have an adverse im-
pact on these considerations.
Courts have encountered all three of these concerns- contami-
nation, privacy, and safety-and examined the potential impact of
publicity on the defendant's right to a fair trial.' 77 The main empha-
sis, however, remains on the defendant's right to a fair trial above all
else. For example, publicizing the names of the veniremen and their
responses to voir dire questions could leave them open to ridicule at
the hands of those who know them, or even those who do not. 178
The knowledge that their responses will be broadcast to all may also
inhibit or destroy the integrity of their responses to questions. 179
Finally, this openness may leave the jurors open to attack at the
hands of the defendant's comrades.' 8 0 If potential jurors are con-
cerned about any of these factors, they may choose, consciously or
170 See Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 823; supra note 169 and accompanying text.
171 Public scrutiny may also work against the defendant; for example, the defendant
might have had the opportunity to make a favorable deal with the prosecutor but for the
public eye. It is not necessarily a fair trial by custom, but the public might demand that
something be done.
172 Commercial Printing, 553 S.W.2d at 273.
[Public access] may well have a salutary effect. Cases have been reversed in this
court because of answers given by prospective jurors on voir dire which subsequent
investigation established were false, or at least incorrect, and which might have well
disqualified the prospective juror. Particular spectators in a courtroom may know of
such facts and call them to the attention of interested parties.
Id.
173 See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
174 United States v. Layton, 519 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
175 Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 825.
176 United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907
(1980).
177 See Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 825; Barnes, 604 F.2d at 134-35; Layton, 519 F.
Supp. at 961-62.
178 See Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 825.
179 See Layton, 519 F. Supp. at 961-62.
180 See Barnes, 602 F.2d at 134-35.
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otherwise, to compensate in the interest of self-preservation by giv-
ing misleading responses or by concealing information. Conse-
quently, the voir dire may not successfully elicit the information
necessary to effectively screen the jurors, information that may later
adversely affect the fairness of a trial.
In addition to the defendant's right to a fair trial, the Supreme
Court also has acknowledged the possible existence of a juror pri-
vacy right that might become sufficiently compelling to require lim-
iting public access to a criminal proceeding. 18' Because of the
overwhelming policy reasons supporting the primacy of a defend-
ant's right to a fair trial,' 8 2 however, it is inconceivable that a juror's
right to privacy could take precedence over the defendant's right.
Although the Court did not specifically explore the ramifications of
such a privacy right, 18 3 the most reasonable approach would have
the trial judge, guided by the polestar of the defendant's right to a
fair trial, consider juror privacy only as it pertains to the defendant's
right to a fair trial. 184
In most cases, any privacy interests of the veniremen will be
protected during the voir dire proceedings through the discretion of
the trial judge.185 This discretion previously has been exercised to
prevent unnecessarily intrusive voir dire questions. 186 More re-
cently, however, trial judges have exercised their discretion to limit
voir dire to protect juror safety 187 or to prevent irrelevant question-
181 Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 825.
182 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text. The Court's failure to explore the
privacy implications may have been due to a conviction that reasonable juror privacy
expectations are de minimis or nonexistent. Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 826 n.I. The
Court stated:
As to most of the information sought during voir dire, it is difficult to believe
that when a prospective juror receives notice that he is called to serve, he has an
expectation, either actual or reasonable, that what he says in court will be kept pri-
vate. Despite the fact that a juror does not put himself voluntarily into the public
eye, a trial is a public event. . . . And, as the Court makes clear today, voir dire, like
the trial itself, is presumptively a public proceeding. The historical evidence indi-
cates that voir dire has been conducted in public and most prospective jurors are
aware that they will be asked questions during voir dire to determine whether they
can judge impartially.
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also infra notes 185-88 and accom-
panying text.
184 See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
185 See Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 826 n.1.
186 See Sprouce v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cas. 375 (1823); Ryder v. State, 100 Ga. 528,
534-35, 28 S.E. 246, 248 (1897) ("Neither the court nor counsel should ask questions
tending to incriminate or disgrace the veniremen").
187 See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d at 140.
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ing'8 8 in order to provide the necessary privacy protection indi-
rectly. To the extent that a potential juror's individual right of
privacy is threatened by relevant questioning despite these safe-
guards, that juror's privacy can be protected adequately by releasing
a transcript of responses while concealing the juror's identity.18 9 In
some situations, the privacy interest may be so compelling as to lead
the trial judge to exclude a potential juror from jury service. 190 De-
spite these privacy considerations, the Press-Enterprise Court's recog-
nition of the defendant's right to a fair trial as a paramount
compelling interest1 9 1 seems to limit the consideration of any poten-
tial juror's privacy interest as a competing factor; privacy can be
considered only as it affects an accused's right to a fair trial. 192
Treating potential jurors' privacy interests in this way respects the
primary consideration of ensuring a fair trial and vastly simplifies
the trial court's balancing process, thus greatly enhancing the work-
ability of the Press-Enterprise standard.
The Press-Enterprise decision also espouses a narrow tailoring of
any limitation on access,' 93 but is less than clear on the interpreta-
tion of "narrow." In attempting to apply the Press-Enterprise stan-
dard, a trial judge must wonder whether any narrowly tailored
limitation would suffice, an option seemingly left open by the lan-
guage of the majority, 194 or whether such limitation must be "the
least restrictive means available," as recommended by Justice Mar-
shall.' 9 5 Although the majority position conceivably could endorse
Justice Marshall's position regarding "the least restrictive
means, '" 96 the more probable interpretation would appear to sup-
port any sufficiently narrow limitation. In any event, it would be-
hoove the trial judge to employ the most narrowly tailored
restriction on access because the least restrictive means best serves
the vital interests involved and, more pragmatically, because costly
188 See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345, 1355 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Salley v. United States, 432 U.S. 909 (1977).
189 Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 830 (Marshall,J., concurring in thejudgment). "Only
in the most extraordinary circumstances can the substance of ajuror's response to ques-
tioning at voir dire be permanently excluded from the salutary scrutiny of the public and
the press." Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). Burger's majority opinion
endorses a very similar form of limited closure. See id. at 825.
190 Id.
19' Id. at 823.
192 See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
193 Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 824.
'94 Id.
195 Id. at 830 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
196 Id. at 825. The Court suggested that one of the main considerations would be to
minimize the risk of unnecessary closure. Id. at 825. Logically, anything other than the
least restrictive means must almost certainly involve a degree of unnecessary closure.
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reversals can be avoided more easily. 197
Finally, courts have dealt with the problem of choosing the "ac-
ceptable" limitation in myriad ways. 198 Where the circumstances of
a particular trial endanger juror safety, courts have sought to pro-
tect the prospective jurors through "complete anonymity, namely,
no disclosure of name or address."'199 Another example of a com-
promise closure found acceptable by a reviewing court involved a
restriction on the number of press representatives present during
voir dire, along with restrictions on the dissemination of the poten-
tial jurors' names. 200
The Press-Enterprise majority also suggested imposing an affirm-
ative duty upon prospective jurors to "request an opportunity to
present the problem to the judge in camera but with counsel present
and on the record," 20 ' once they realize the sensitive nature of the
questions involved.202 Whether the Court posited this procedure as
a requirement or, more likely, as another alternative available to
trial courts, trial judges at least should consider this procedure be-
cause it "can ensure that there is in fact a valid basis for a belief that
disclosure infringes a significant interest in privacy." 203 By requir-
ing a prospective juror to come forward with his or her privacy con-
cerns, this procedure will weed out the more frivolous claims of
privacy infringement, which will be on the record in any event; it
also enables the court to protect legitimate privacy concerns by
withholding that portion of the record, or by otherwise protecting
the juror's privacy through less restrictive means.
As a result of the Press-Enterprise decision, the public right of
access to criminal proceedings appears to extend to all facets ofju-
dicial involvement in a formally initiated criminal proceeding. The
Supreme Court considered the determination of whether the voir
197 Appellate review tends to be ex post analysis while the trial judge must necessarily
make his limitation determination ex ante. This emphasis by the court could be determi-
native because any risk or threat already will have materialized with a retrospective ex-
amination of the circumstances; consequently, the reviewing court may overturn many
of the closure decisions because it does not face the urgency and time limitations placed
upon a trial judge. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Rapid City Jour-
nal v. Circuit Court, 283 N.W.2d 563 (S.D. 1979). But see Gannett, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
198 See, e.g., supra notes 16-17.
199 See, e.g., Barnes, 604 F.2d at 135. The Second Circuit sustained this limitation on
access because of the extensive pretrial publicity and because of the" 'sordid history' of
multi-defendant narcotics cases tried in the Southern District." Id. at 134.
200 See Layton, 519 F. Supp. at 961-62.
201 Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 825.
202 Id.
203 Id.
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dire is part of the "trial" as superfluous to its decision. 204 Hence,
the existence of a public right of access does not hinge on the partic-
ular stage of the trial; the access decision should be made regardless
of the status of the trial. Different facets of a trial, however, will
necessarily affect whether particular interests militate for or against
public access, as the Gannett decision suggests.20 5
Has the Supreme Court changed its mind since deciding Gan-
nett ? Recall that Gannett involved the closure of a pretrial suppres-
sion hearing in which no objections were voiced at the time of
closure.20 6 Although the trial court later held a hearing on Gannett
Company's objections to the closure order, the trial court sustained
its previous closure order because an open proceeding posed a
"reasonable probability of prejudice" to the defendant. 20 7
Although the findings presented in the Gannett opinion are hardly
specific, the fact that the trial court released a transcript once the
danger of prejudice had dissipated militated heavily for affirmance
of the order in the eyes of the Court. Additionally, the trial judge's
recognition of a right of public access in his determination to tem-
porarily close the hearing served to further convince the Court.20 8
If the fact situation in Gannett were presented to the Court today,
the decision would be the same, although the record would most
likely present the trial judge's grounds for closure more fully.
V. CONCLUSION
The Press-Enterprise decision enabled the Supreme Court to ex-
tend the previously established first amendment public right of ac-
cess to criminal trials to potentially encompass the entire criminal
proceeding. The Court appears to have acknowledged this right of
access to all proceedings in the context of an impermissibly closed
voir dire review. Additionally, the Court has clarified its standard of
closure by implying that, given a choice of alternatives, trial judges
should choose the least restrictive access limitation if they feel that
an open trial would, in fact, threaten a competing, compelling inter-
est, the most important of which is a defendant's right to a fair trial.
Any narrow limitation on access would appear to be acceptable, but
given the Court's apparent bias against unnecessary closure, trial
204 See supra notes 97, 126-34 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
206 443 U.S. at 392.
207 Id at 392-93.
208 lM. at 393.
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judges should attempt to select the narrowest alternative, which
would logically minimize any unnecessary closure.
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